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CASE NOTES
Evidence-FLORIDA COURT USES BROAD ADVERSE PARTY WITNESS
DEFINITION FOR BOTH IMPEACHMENT AND ADMISSIONS PUR-
POSES-Smith v. Fortune Insurance Co., 404 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
In Smith v. Fortune Insurance Co.,1 the First District Court of
Appeal expanded the definition of an adverse party witness for im-
peachment purposes to include persons not named as party oppo-
nents in the litigation.2 Perhaps even more significantly, however,
the court determined that the unnamed party's out-of-court state-
ments were within the admissions exception to the hearsay rule.8
The court reached that conclusion by extending its broad defini-
tion of adverse party witness for impeachment purposes to the
area of admissions by a party opponent. The court determined
"[o]ne need not be named in the pleadings. . . to be called as an
adverse party witness."'4 Thus, the impeachment of an unnamed
party or the introduction of his statements as admissions was
proper if he " 'occupied an adverse position toward' the party seek-
ing to call him . . . and could have been named as a party."'
By applying this broad test to the hearsay exception for admis-
sions by a party opponent, out-of-court statements of an unnamed
party become available as substantive evidence without the incon-
venience of actual joinder of the unnamed p,-zty at the trial.' Such
a holding ignores the need for a distinction between admissibility
standards for statements made by an unnamed party when offered
as substantive admissions and standards applicable to statements
offered for impeachment purposes.
Fortune Insurance Company had issued Louis Smith a home-
owner's policy on his mobile home. About one year later, a fire
completely destroyed the mobile home and its contents. The day
after the fire, Lieutenant Moore of the Bradford County Sheriff's
Department interviewed Smith's nineteen-year-old daughter,
1. 404 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
2. Id. at 822.
3. Id. at 822-23.
4. Id. at 823.
5. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Degelos v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 313 F.2d 809, 815
(5th Cir. 1963)).
6. 404 So. 2d at 823. See infra text accompanying notes 42-60.
7. Id. at 822.
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Cathy. According to Moore, "Cathy told him she had been 'playing
with matches' in her bedroom and the bed cover caught fire....
[A]lthough she knew her family was in the trailer, it did not really
matter to her because 'she had had all she could stand, all she
wanted was out.'"
Fortune refused to pay any proceeds under the policy, relying on
a provision excusing the company from liability for loss resulting
from the malicious mischief or vandalism of any household mem-
ber. Smith sued Fortune for recovery. Cathy did not join with him
as a party plaintiff in the suit, although she was an insured under
the terms of the policy.9
During the jury trial, Fortune called Cathy as an adverse party
witness, but she denied starting the fire and denied any knowledge
of how it started. Fortune then called Lieutenant Moore, who was
permitted to testify to Cathy's prior statement made in the
interview.10
After a judgment for Fortune, Smith appealed. Smith claimed
Cathy was not an adverse party because she was not a named
party to the suit. Therefore, he argued, she was not a proper sub-
ject for impeachment under the adverse party witness rule in Flor-
ida, Rule 1.450(a) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,11 and
Fortune as a consequence had improperly impeached its own wit-
ness. 12 Further, Smith claimed Cathy was not a proper party as
contemplated by the admissions exception to the hearsay rule and
her out-of-court statements should not have been admitted as
admissions."3
In rejecting Smith's assertions, the court fashioned a broad ad-
verse party witness test encompassing any person who occupies an
adverse position toward the calling party and who could have been
named a party.1 4 This test was met by Cathy, who occupied an
adverse position toward Fortune since most of her belongings were
destroyed in the fire and therefore she stood to gain financially
from her father's insurance policy. The second facet of the test was
met since Cathy was an insured under the terms of the policy and
8. Id.
9. Id. at 823.
10. Id. at 822.
11. See infra text accompanying note 24.
12. 404 So. 2d at 822.
13. Id. Fortune was tried prior to the October 1, 1981, effective date of the Florida Evi-
dence Code, so the common law rules of evidence applied to the case. However, the Fortune
court cited the presently effective evidence code in addition to earlier authority.
14. Id. at 823.
EVIDENCE
could have voluntarily joined in the suit."6
Accordingly, the court held Fortune had properly attacked
Cathy's credibility by impeaching her as an adverse party wit-
ness.'" The opinion in Fortune then rather nonchalantly states
that the same standard that made Cathy an adverse party means
"testimony regarding Cathy's out-of-court statements came within
the 'admissions' exception to the hearsay rule" and is admissible as
substantive evidence.17 No other court in Florida has adopted the
broad adverse party test espoused in Fortune for both impeach-
ment and admissions purposes.
I. WHO IS AN ADVERSE PARTY WITNESS FOR THE PURPOSE OF
IMPEACHMENT?
Historically, the common law "voucher rule" prohibited a party
from impeaching his own witness in any way.16 The reason most
frequently offered to support this doctrine was that a party should
vouch for the credibility of his own witnesses; he should not call a
witness he knows will testify untruthfully. 9 The rule often pro-
duced harsh results 0 because a party "does not select his wit-
nesses, but simply takes the witnesses as he finds them."'
In response to such concerns, courts and legislatures eventually
created exceptions to the rule in certain circumstances. The major
exception in Florida is codified in the Florida Evidence Code. The
Code permits a party to use prior inconsistent statements and
other contradictory evidence to impeach a witness who proves to
be adverse.22 Adversity has been defined as giving testimony which
15. Id. at 823 n.1. Under the policy, the word "insured" included the named insured
(Louis Smith) and his spouse, relatives and any others under the age of twenty-one who
were residents of the household.
16. Id. at 822.
17. Id. at 822-23.
18. See Johnson v. State, 178 So. 2d 724, 726 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965); C. EHRHARDT,
FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 608.2 (1977 & Supp. 1981); C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 38 (2d ed. 1972); 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW §§ 896-918 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); Graham, Examination of a Party's Own Witness
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Promise Unfulfilled, 54 Thx. L. REV. 917, 919-22
(1976).
19. C. EHRHARDT, supra note 18, § 608.2.
20. As applied to Fortune for example, the rule in its original form would prevent For-
tune from attempting to impeach Cathy's trial testimony in any way. Because Fortune
called Cathy as a witness, it would be expected to vouch for her credibility, an unrealistic
expectation in view of her relationship to her family and her status as an insured.
21. Graham, supra note 18, at 920.
22. FLA. STAT. § 90.608 (1981). Who may impeach.-
(1) Any party, except the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility
19821
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affirmatively harms the case of the calling party.2 Another excep-
tion and the one made available to the insurance company in For-
tune is Rule 1.450(a) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure-the
adverse witness rule:
A party may interrogate any unwilling or hostile witness by
leading questions. A party may call an adverse party or an officer,
director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or
of a partnership or association which is an adverse party and in-
terrogate him by leading questions and contradict and impeach
him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party
and the witness thus called may be contradicted and impeached
by or on behalf of the adverse party also and may be cross-ex-
amined by the adverse party only upon the subject matter of his
of a witness by:
(a) Introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with
his present testimony.
(b) Showing that the witness is biased.
(c) Attacking the character of the witness in accordance with the provi-
sions of s. 90.609 or s. 90.610.
(d) Showing a defect of capacity, ability, or opportunity in the witness
to observe, remember, or recount the matters about which he testified.
(e) Proof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by
the witness being impeached.
(2) A party calling a witness shall not be allowed to impeach his character as
provided in s. 90.609 or s. 90.610, but, if the witness proves adverse, such party
may contradict the witness by other evidence or may prove that the witness has
made an inconsistent statement at another time, without regard to whether the
party was surprised by the testimony of the witness. Leading questions may be
used during any examination under this subsection.
Section 608 is the provision currently in effect in Florida. FLA. STAT. § 90.09 (1977) was
the provision in effect prior to the adoption of the evidence code and still governs causes
accruing prior to the effective date of the code.
Smith had argued Cathy did not qualify for impeachment as an adverse witness under §
90.09. Apparently, the First District Court of Appeal agreed, because the provision was not
discussed in Fortune, nor cited as a ground for decision. The statute permitted a party to
contradict and introduce the prior inconsistent statement of any witness who proved ad-
verse. However, it had been judicially interpreted to require that the witness surprise the
calling party and affirmatively harm his case. Failure to testify as beneficially as expected or
failure to remember was not sufficient enough to show the affirmative harm necessary to
invoke the statute. Presumably, Cathy's failure to remember was too insufficient a showing
to classify her as an adverse witness. See Poitier v. State, 303 So. 2d 409, 410 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1974); Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Cutler, 212 So. 2d 37, 40 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1968); Johnson v. State, 178 So. 2d 724, 728 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
Section 608 specifically deletes the requirement of surprise. It still requires the witness's
testimony to affirmatively harm the calling party's case. See generally Rossano v. Blue Plate
Foods, Inc., 314 F.2d 174, 178 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 866 (1963); C. EHRHARDT,
supra note 18, § 608.2; Graham, supra note 18, at 920.
23. C. EHRHARIDr, supra note 18, § 608.2; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 38.
[Vol. 10:277
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examination in chief.2 '
The effect of Rule 1.450(a) is to allow impeachment of adverse
parties without the predicate of testimony which affirmatively
harms the calling party's case. The only prerequisite to the invoca-
tion of this provision is that the witness called must actually be an
adverse party.25 Therefore, the definition one ascribes to an ad-
verse party can be crucial if impeachment of that witness is essen-
tial to the effective presentation of the case.
Out-of-court statements introduced under Rule 1.450(a) are ac-
cepted only to attack a witness's credibility.2 6 Since the rule only
operates when an adverse party is called to the witness stand, the
statements will not be introduced unless the party is in court testi-
fying under oath. Rule 1.450(a) expressly provides that the im-
peached party is subject to cross-examination by both parties to
the litigation. Therefore, opposing counsel will have an opportu-
nity to rehabilitate the witness through cross-examination. This
opportunity for rehabilitative cross-examination is considered a
guarantee of reliability sufficient to overcome the possible prejudi-
cial effect of introducing out-of-court statements for the limited
purpose of impeachment.27
Usually, there is no question about whether a witness is an ad-
verse party. The test is satisfied because the party witness will be
named in the pleadings. In some cases, however, the witness whose
credibility is under attack will not actually be named a party, per-
haps due to oversight, faulty joinder, problems of venue, jurisdic-
24. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.450(a). The first sentence of Rule 1.450(a) permits a party to inter-
rogate any hostile or unwilling witness by leading questions. The provision is unsatisfactory
from the standpoint of trial strategy. It only permits the use of leading questions, not the
proof of prior inconsistent statements, which was Fortune's goal. Therefore, Fortune could
only hope to impeach Cathy as an adverse party witness under the second clause. See Pitts
v. State, 333 So. 2d 109, 110-11 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Foremost Dairies, Inc. v.
Cutler, 212 So. 2d 37, 40 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
25. See also Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Cutler, 212 So. 2d 37, 40 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1968).
26. At the present time in Florida, prior inconsistent statements may be used only to
impeach a witness; they are inadmissible as substantive evidence. See Adams v. State, 15
So. 905, 908 (Fla. 1894); Thomas v. State, 289 So. 2d 419, 420-21 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1974). The original enactment of the Florida Evidence Code allowed any prior inconsistent
statement of a witness to be admitted as substantive evidence on its merit; however, the
1978 amendment to FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(a) limited the admissibility of prior inconsistent
statements as substantive evidence to those given under oath, subject to the penalty of per-
jury during a trial, hearing, other proceeding or in a deposition. The Florida position is
essentially the same as that of Fed. R. Evid. § 801. See C. EHRHARiyr, supra note 18, § 801.6.
27. See Wigginton, New Florida Common Law Rules, 3 U. FLA. L. REv. 1, 26-27 (1950).
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tion, service of process, or tactical considerations. Then the ques-
tion arises as to whether the witness is an adverse party witness
subject to impeachment.
Two lines of case law have developed interpreting the term "ad-
verse party. '28 One endorses a narrow definition and limits adverse
parties to named parties who are adversely aligned in the plead-
ings. 29 The other line of cases, followed primarily by the federal
courts, is much broader. The federal standard potentially expands
adverse party to include anyone who occupies an adverse position
toward the calling party and who could have been named a party.30
The cases in Florida defining adverse party prior to Fortune
reach conflicting results. The most widely cited case on the subject
is Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Cutler,". a Fourth District Court of
Appeal case in which the narrow definition-named parties ad-
versely aligned in the pleadings-is favored. A key witness in Fore-
most was not a named party, but because of his family ties to a
party and his possible financial interest in the outcome of the suit,
the opposing party tried to call him as an adverse party witness.82
The Foremost court stated the witness was "clearly not an 'ad-
verse party' within the definition of Rule 1.450(a),' '3 and defined
an adverse party as a "party to the litigation who had an adverse
interest in its outcome." 4
28. Puccio v. Diamond Hill Ski Area, Inc., 385 A.2d 650, 655 n.6 (R.I. 1978). See also
Graham, supra note 18, at 952.
29. See Alm v. General Tel., 327 N.E.2d 523 (Ill. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Miller v.
Griesel, 297 N.E.2d 463 (Ind. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Serafin v. Peoples Community Hosp.,
242 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976); Kauffman v. Carlisle Cement Products Co., 323 A.2d
750 (Penn. Super. Ct. 1974).
30. See Melton v. O.F. Shearer & Sons, Inc., 436 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1970); Chumbler v.
Alabama Power Co., 362 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1966); Degelos v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 313
F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1963).
31. 212 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1968). See, e.g., C. EHRHARDT, supra note 18, §
608.2; Fla. Bar Cont. Leg. Ed., Witnesses, Evidence in Florida § 4.2.
32. 212 So. 2d at 39. In Foremost, Mrs. Cutler had sued Foremost for the wrongful death
of her son who was killed when his motorbike collided with a Foremost truck during the
early part of the evening. One issue discussed in the case was whether Foremost could call
the deceased's brother as an adverse party witness and attempt to impeach him with an
alleged statement he had made to the investigation officer that the headlights on his
brother's motorbike were not in working condition at the time of the accident.
33. Id. at 41. Although the Foremost court stated that Cutler was not an adverse party
within the definition of Rule 1.450(a), it should be noted the rule does not define the term
"adverse party."
34. 212 So. 2d at 40. The definition could have been worded more precisely, but it is
apparent when read with the facts of the case that the words "a party to the litigation"
mean "a named party." The words "who has an adverse interest in its outcome" imply that
not all named parties are adverse parties, only those named parties with an interest in its
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Smith v. Fortune Insurance Co. chose to endorse the broader
adverse party approach which includes unnamed parties in certain
instances. The opinion relies exclusively on opinions utilizing the
expansive adverse party definition.3 5 A Third District Court of Ap-
peal case cited in Fortune describes an adverse party as "not nec-
essarily a party to the suit who is aligned in the pleadings in oppo-
sition to the party calling him. ''1 6
The Fortune court also cited two federal cases in which the
broad test was adopted. In Degelos v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 7
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, on a factual situation similar to
Fortune, declared that "the insured, the alleged tortfeasor, occu-
pied an adverse position toward the injured party plaintiff and as
such was an 'adverse party.'-88 Also cited in Fortune was a later
Fifth Circuit case, Chumbler v. Alabama Power Co.,39 in which the
court affirmed the broad adverse party definition for impeachment
purposes. The opinion states:
[TIhe sole issue is whether the party sought to be called occupies
an adverse position to the party seeking to call him .... [T]he
identity of the named party is irrelevant. The question is whether
the party sought to be called could have been sued .... If so,
and if the witness is an alleged tort-feasor, and if the standard for
recovery would be the same whichever were sued, he is an adverse
party. 0
The Fortune opinion does not include the tortfeasor language so
outcome contrary to that of the calling party.
35. 404 So. 2d at 823.
36. See Rubin v. Kapell, 105 So. 2d 28, 32 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1958). See also Young
v. Metropolitan Dade Co., 201 So. 2d 594, 596 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967). The Rubin and
Young tests are worded in the negative and, standing alone, could be confusing and suscep-
tible to other interpretations.
37. 313 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1963).
38. Id. at 815. In Degelos, a father who was a passenger in a car driven by his son was
killed in a collision at an intersection with another car coming from the opposite direction.
The widow sued Fidelity and Casualty Company, her son's insurer. The critical issue on
which recovery under the policy hinged was whether the son was negligent in falling to stop
at a posted sign at the intersection. The issue of negligence, in turn hinged on whether the
son knew about or saw the sign. Therefore, his testimony was critical to resolution of the
issue.
39. 362 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1966). In Chumbler, Mrs. Chumbler sued Alabama Power
Company to recover damages for the accidental eletrocution of her husband. She claimed
the power company was negligent in failing to de-energize a power line near a construction
site at which her husband was working. The question of negligence depended on the testi-
mony of a power company employee who was not a named defendant.
40. Id. at 163.
1982]
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noticeably present in the two federal court cases. 41 Considering the
precedent on which the opinion is based, such a limitation is cer-
tainly appropriate. While not unduly burdening the calling party,
the federal court definition provides the named opponent with
some measure of protection against being victimized through im-
peachment of a witness with little or no nexus to the case.
II. WHO IS A PARTY OPPONENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE
ADMISSIONS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE?
Complicating a resolution of the adverse party issue in Fortune
is the court's insistence on allowing the out-of-court statements
made by the insured's daughter, Cathy, to be used as admissions
against a party opponent. The opinion does not clearly explain the
reasoning underlying the labeling of these statements as admis-
sions by Cathy, an unnamed party.
The only case cited as support for the admission of Cathy's
statements as substantive proof of the matter stated therein is
Hunt v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad.4 Hunt is the pre-evidence
code authority for adopting the admissions exception to the hear-
say rule.4" Hunt states the common law rule that an admission by
a party opponent or an adverse party is admissible as substantive
evidence and not just for the limited purpose of impeachment."
41. See, e.g., Iverson v. Lancaster 158 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1976), in which the Supreme
Court of North Dakota stated that unless one is named as an adverse party he may not be
examined as an adverse party unless his conduct gives rise to the cause of action.
The position on the subject in Florida prior to Fortune is somewhat unclear. Rule 1.450(a)
was derived from Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(b), and the language of the two are identical. Thus, it
could be argued that the more expansive federal definition of adverse party should prevail
in Florida. However, it is not clear that the definition of adverse party was so expansive at
the time the federal rule was adopted.
Instead, it seems the expansion developed through judicial decisions. Since these decisions
were rendered after Florida's Rule 1.450(a) was originally enacted, it is unlikely that the
broader definition of adverse party was contemplated at the time of its adoption.
42. 327 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1976).
43. As Fortune was decided prior to the effective date of the evidence code, the common
law rules of evidence applied.
44. The exception is now governed by the Florida Evidence Code. The Fortune opinion
mentions FLA. STAT. § 90.803(18), the admissions exception to the hearsay rule, so the court
apparently intended the opinion to apply to the law on the admissions exception both
before and after the evidence code was adopted. The current statute provides:
90.803 Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial.-The
provision of s. 90.802 to the contrary notwithstanding, the following are not inad-
missible as evidence, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
(18) ADMISSIONS.-A statement that is offered against a party and is:
(a) His own statement in either an individual or a representative
EVIDENCE
The opinion speaks of admissions by a party opponent or an ad-
verse party, but does not explain whether the two terms have the
same meaning. Although it suggests needless repetition, it seems
reasonable to assume the court would have defined the terms if
they were intended to produce different effects on the admissions
exception. There is no mention in Hunt of who qualifies as an ad-
verse party. Thus the Fortune court's reliance on Hunt to allow
admissions against an unnamed, yet adverse, party remains some-
thing of a mystery.
Heretofore, it has been recognized that the only prerequisite to
the introduction of an out-of-court statement as an admission is a
showing that the statement was actually made by a party to the
litigation."5 Then the statement will be admitted as substantive
evidence of the facts admitted by that declarant-party when it is
offered by his adversary."' The party against whom the admissions
are offered is not required to testify or to be present in court.4 7 If
the party does testify, the out-of-court statement is not required to
be inconsistent with his trial testimony48 or to be against the de-
clarant's interest.4
9
There is no intrinsic assurance that statements offered as admis-
sions are reliable or were made under reliable conditions. Because
of this lack of reliability, admissions are unlike other exceptions to
the hearsay rule.50 The reason most frequently given for excluding
capacity;
(b) A statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its
truth;
(c) A statement by a person specifically authorized by him to make a
statement concerning the subject;
(d) A statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the
scope of the agency or employment thereof, made during the existence of
the relationship; or
(e) A statement by a person who was a coconspirator of the party dur-
ing the course, and in furtherance, of the conspiracy. Upon request of coun-
sel, the court shall instruct the jury that the conspiracy itself and each
member's participation in it must be established by independent evidence,
either before the introduction of any evidence or before evidence is admit-
ted under this paragraph.
45. C. EHRHARDT, supra note 18, § 803.18.
46. See, e.g., 327 So. 2d at 195-96. See generally D. BINDER, THE HEARSAY HANDBOOK §
28 (1975 & Supp. 1981); C. EHRHARDT, supra note 18, § 803.18; C. MCCORMICK, supra note
18, § 262; Hetland, Admissions in the Uniform Rules: Are They Necessary?, 46 IOWA L.
REv. 308, 309 (1961).
47. 327 So. 2d at 195-96; C. EHRHARDT, supra note 18, § 803.
48. Id. § 803.18.
49. Id. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 262.
50. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 262.
1982]
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hearsay evidence is its unreliability, i.e., the statement is generated
out of court and there is no immediate opportunity to test its ve-
racity through cross-examination of the declarant under oath in
front of a jury.5 Most exceptions to the hearsay rule are recog-
nized because there is some rational basis for assuming the out-of-
court statements are truthful."2
The justification for permitting admissions as exceptions to the
hearsay rule lies in the adversary system itself; a party cannot rea-
sonably object that he cannot cross-examine himself or claim he is
only credible when testifying in court under oath.53 Additionally,
admissions are not conclusive on the facts admitted therein. The
party against whom the statements are offered can take the stand
to dispute the veracity of the statements or the statements may
carry little probative value in the context in which they are of-
fered." Thus, admissions against a named party are accepted be-
cause the procedural mechanism of the adversary system protects
the rights of the party against whom the statements are admitted.
The issue presented by Fortune should not be confused with the
types of statements that fall within the admissions exception. The
court did not characterize Cathy's statements as either admissions
of the named plaintiff in an individual or representative capacity,
adoptive admissions, authorized admissions, admissions by an em-
ployee or servant, or as a statement of a co-conspirator. 5 None of
the above categories would comprise Cathy's statements on the
facts known to the court. The only way the statements could come
51. See City of Miami v. Fletcher, 167 So. 2d 638, 639 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964); C.
EHRHARDT, supra note 18, § 801.1.
52. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 262; J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, 4 WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE § 801-136 (Supp. 1981); Hetland, supra note 46, at 309.
53. For a general discussion of the theories underlying the receipt of admissions, see C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 262; J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 52, § 801-136-37.
One commentator has observed:
A litigant can scarcely complain if the court refuses to take seriously his allegation
that his extra-judicial statements are so little worthy of credence that the trier of
fact should not even consider them. He can hardly be heard to object that he was
not under oath or that he had no opportunity to cross-examine himself. Accord-
ingly, his relevant utterances are everywhere receivable as admissions against him
for the truth of the matter asserted in them, and it makes no difference whether
they were self-serving or against his interest when made. There content may affect
their weight; it cannot control their admissibility.
Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARv. L. REV. 461 (1929).
54. See C. EHRHARDT, supra note 18, § 803.18 n.14; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 262.
55. See C. EHRHARDT, supra note 18, § 803.18A-E; Morgan, supra note 53, at 479-82;
Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 564,
580 (1937).
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into the record as substantive evidence was for the court to some-
how bring Cathy, an unnamed party, within the term "party" as
used in the admissions exception. The First District accomplished
this by enlarging the term "party opponent" to encompass adverse
parties as that term had just been used to allow the impeachment
of Cathy.
However, if admissions are received against a party not named
in the pleadings, as was the case in Fortune, the requisite fairness
underlying the admissions exception is not present. The most dras-
tic example of the potential unfairness created by using the broad
adverse party test propounded in Fortune involves the possible un-
availability of the unnamed party at trial. Since the admission ex-
ception is applicable regardless of the presence at the trial of the
person who made the out-of-court statement, the named party may
suffer from the lack of opportunity to call the unnamed party to
the stand to explain the statement or to test the reliability of the
statement through cross-examination of the witness. Thus the
named party's case or defense may be damaged without an oppor-
tunity to nullify or mitigate the statements. Moreover, to add in-
sult to injury, the named party may not even be aware of the possi-
bility of the unnamed party's statements being introduced against
him and thus may fail to prepare accordingly.
Therefore, those parties already named in the pleadings must
face the possibility of out-of-court statements by unnamed, absent
parties coming into evidence as substantive proof without the pro-
tection of cross-examination. Although admissions by one party
generally are not evidence against other parties so aligned," the
Fortune decision may be used to demonstrate the practical effect
of admitting the out-of-court statements of an unnamed party as
substantive evidence.
For example, in Fortune, Cathy's father, a named party, might
well have complained about the lack of opportunity to cross-ex-
amine Cathy, an unnamed party, had she not in fact been called by
the insurance company or if she was not otherwise available. Her
admission was made out of his presence and could have been made
under duress or for any number of reasons. There is no assurance
Cathy's statement was truthful or reliable and it is unfair to expect
her father to bear the burden of her statement without the benefit
of cross-examination. In this case, however, Fortune did call Cathy
to testify and did introduce her prior inconsistent statement to at-
56. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 262.
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tack her credibility under Rule 1.450(a). Thus her father's counsel
was able to attempt to rehabilitate her and to test the reliability of
her statement through cross-examination.
Courts in other jurisdictions have tended to accept admissions as
substantive evidence on a much more restricted basis than the
Fortune court.57 Generally, if a person is not a named party, his
admission will be admissible only when he is a real party in inter-
est.58 Otherwise, the unnamed party's statements are inadmissible
in the suit and will be admissible only in a separate action in which
the declarant is named a party. 9
The real issue in Fortune is whether it is fair to admit the out-
of-court statements of an unnamed party as substantive evidence.
When the adversary system adequately protects the interests of all
parties involved-in particular, when the declarant is in court tes-
tifying subject to cross-examination-it may indeed be fair to ac-
cept the admissions of an unnamed party if the statement provides
relevant, probative evidence.60
III. CONCLUSION
It is inappropriate as a general rule to admit the out-of-court
statements of unnamed parties as substantive evidence under the
admissions exception to the hearsay rule. The Fortune court's use
of the same broad adverse party test for impeachment and admis-
sions purposes is a damaging judicial enlargement of a limited evi-
dentiary exception. It would be more appropriate to admit the out-
of-court statements only of named parties under the admissions
57. See, e.g., Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979). But see Melton v.
O.F. Shearer & Sons, Inc., 436 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1970).
58. See, e.g., Lewis v. American Road Ins. Co., 167 S.E.2d 729, 732 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969)
("An admission by a person not a party to the action however is admissible in evidence only
where the party making the admission is the real party in interest, although not a party to
the record. ... ); Sherman v. Mountaire Poultry Co., 419 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Ark. 1967)
("The authorities have extended this to admissions or declarations against interest made by
a person who is not a party of record but who is a real party in interest.").
In some cases, out-of-court statements made by named parties may not be accepted un-
less the named party has a vital interest in the outcome of the case. This limitation is in-
tended to prevent the receipt of admissions in situations when the person making the state-
ment could not be affected by the judgment and is a party only because an adversary chose
to name him. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gudmunson, 495 F. Supp. 794, 796 n.1
(D. Mont. 1980).
59. See Scott v. State, 240 N.Y.S.2d 279 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963). See also Alabama Power
Co. v. Ray, 32 So. 2d 219, 221 (Ala. 1947); Bristol v. Moser, 99 P.2d 706, 709 (Ariz. 1940);
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Bowen, 63 S.E.2d 804 (Va. 1951).
60. See Shell v. Parrish, 448 F.2d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 1971).
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exception to the hearsay rule and thus as substantive evidence. In-
deed, it may be well to limit admissions to only those named par-
ties with a substantial interest in the outcome of the case.
At most, the adverse party definition in Fortune should be used
to determine who is an adverse party witness for the purpose of
impeachment under Rule 1.450(a). Although Fortune requires the
witness to occupy an adverse position toward the party calling him
and to be one who could have been named a party, it should be
limited to tortfeasors or others with a sufficient nexus to the litiga-
tion. The possibility of construing the broad adverse party test in
Fortune to cover both impeachment and admissions should not be
recognized as an option by Florida courts in any event since to do
so would defeat the policies underlying the statutorily limited ad-
missions exception to the hearsay rule.
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